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  2Introduction 
In a series of papers published during the past few years, World Bank economists 
have provided detailed projections by simulating the possible outcomes of the Doha 
Round negotiations
1. The projections have been obtained by using the LINKAGE Model, 
which is considered to be a global dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model. The latest version of the LINKAGE Model, viz. LINK6, which these papers have 
relied on, uses the Global Trade Analysis Program (GTAP). LINK6 incorporates 87 
countries/regions and 57 sectors and uses a dataset that has been updated up to 2001. This 
latter feature of the model, according to the authors, has helped generation of far more 
realistic results than those that were using the earlier versions, which had incorporated 
data only up to 1997. 
This note attempts a critical assessment of the above-mentioned papers. At the 
outset, we would provide an analysis of the results that have been presented by looking at 
their implications for the developing countries in general and India, in particular. In the 
second part of the note, we would broadly allude to some of the methodological problems 
that are associated with the CGE models of the genre of the LINKAGE model. Our 
contention is that the limitations of these models, especially in terms of the assumptions 
on which they are based, deserve close scrutiny and that this dimension needs to be kept 
in view as the results obtained from studies are read. 
                                                 
1 The most quoted of these papers are by Kym Anderson, Will Martin and Dominique van der 
Mensbrugghe. See references for details. 
* Professor and Head, Centre for WTO Studies IIFT. The views expressed are personal. 
  3Analysis of the Results 
The LINKAGE model provides a baseline projection of the world economy first 
to 2005 and then to 2015 assuming no other policy changes. Deviations from that 
baseline in 2015, due to total liberalization from 2005, are then examined
2. The 
simulations for 2015 are based on alternative scenarios of trade liberalisation emerging 
from the current round of multilateral trade negotiations. The results have been presented 
based on two sets of assumptions. The first assumes full liberalisation of global 
merchandise trade. The projections relying on this assumption are worked out on the 
basis of a new source for protection data, which integrates trade preferences, specific 
tariffs and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Inclusion of NTBs in the 
CGE models has been one of its less satisfactory aspects. This stems from the fact that 
attempts made thus far to quantify the impact of NTBs has been not been quite 
satisfactory. While the database on non-tariff measures that has been developed by 
UNCTAD, viz. the TRAINS database, is fraught with limitations ranging from 
incomplete coverage
3 and problems relating to the measurement of their differential 
impacts on countries
4, the Market Access Map (MAcMap) database that has been 
developed by ITC along with CEPII (Paris) includes only tariff quotas in its database. 
Considering that the NTBs (i.e. standards et al) are assuming increasing importance in a 
world where tariffs are steadily declining, this limitation of LINK6 needs to be 
highlighted. 
The second set of results is based on some of the key proposals for agricultural 
trade reforms that are being actively discussed in the on-going negotiations. The 
simulations take into consideration proposals for tariff cuts along with those for treating 
some of the tariff lines as “sensitive” or “special products”. What needs to be particularly 
                                                 
2 Anderson et al (2005). 
3 For most countries, TRAINS database covers NTBs till end of the 1990s. In case of India, the NTB-data 
are provided up to 1997, which is even before the removal of quantitative restrictions (QRs) that India was 
maintaining for balance of payments purposes. 
4 For instance, exporters from LDCs and developing countries endowed with relatively low level of 
technical skills would find it very difficult to conform to a technical barrier imposed by a developed 
country. But the same may not be true for other countries. 
  4mentioned here is that none of two sets results take cognisance of the subsidy dimension, 
which, without doubt, holds the key for realising the objective of a distortion-free market 
for agricultural commodities. 
(i)  Full Liberalisation of Global Merchandise Trade 
The first major set of results that is reported in the papers pertains to the effect of 
the on-going trade liberalisation efforts on the real income going up to the year 2015. 
These estimates have been made against the benchmark which assumes a complete 
freeing of merchandise trade over the period 2005-2010. It has been reported that real 
income gains by 2015 for the global economy as a whole would be US $ 287.3 billion per 
year (in 2001 dollars). Of this increase, the developed countries’ would have a share of 
US $ 201.6 billion while for the developing countries the gains would be US $ 85.7 
billion. In other words, the share of the developing countries in the total gains would be a 
third of the total global gains. More importantly, real income gains reported for the 
developing countries would be 0.8 per cent of the baseline income in 2015, which is 
marginally higher than the corresponding figure for the developed countries (0.6 per 
cent). Among the developing countries, while the relatively prosperous Latin American 
region is expected to register real income which would be 1.0 per cent of the baseline 
income in 2015, for the South Asian region the corresponding figure is only 0.4 per cent.  
These broad results lend themselves to two varying interpretations. The first, one 
which has been provided in the papers, is that the results are significantly favourable for 
the developing countries since their expected real income gains are considerably larger 
than their existing share in global production. Thus, while the developing countries’ as a 
whole account for a quarter of the global production at present, they would be able to 
enjoy a third of the global gains in real income that is expected annually until the year 
2015. An alternate view would be that what the results are pointing to is the increasing 
gulf between the relatively prosperous and poorer regions countries. In overall terms, it 
can be said that the disproportionately large gains for the developed countries that the 
papers under discussion have predicted would reinforce the status of the lesser players in 
the global economy as “developing” even after the so-called “development round” has 
been implemented. What is more, the results point to increasing differentiation between 
  5the developing countries as the more prosperous regions are slated to record relatively 
larger increases in real income. 
The disaggregated results provided for a small set of countries broadly reinforce 
the above-mentioned conclusions. India is expected to register a real income gain of only 
US $ 3.4 billion a year, which is 0.4 per cent of the base line income in 2015. In case of 
China, the corresponding figures are US $ 5.6 billion and 0.2 per cent respectively. On 
the other hand, countries like Thailand are expected to gain US $ 7.7 billion, while for 
Argentina, the real income gain could be nearly US $ 5.0 billion (see Table 1 for details). 
From the point of view of developing countries, it is the expected movements in 
the terms of trade that provide the most disquieting numbers for this set of results. In 
what were considered as pioneering studies, Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer had pointed 
out in what are considered as pioneering studies that developing countries, as exporters of 
primary commodities, face deteriorating terms of trade while trading with the exporters 
of manufactured goods viz., the industrialised countries
5. Subsequently, many studies 
have argued that for most of the past six decades, the terms of trade deterioration has 
been a major malaise for the developing countries. In fact, past studies had indicated that 
the developing countries would not have suffered the ignominy of the debt crisis if they 
had not experienced deterioration in their terms of trade. In their attempt to maintain their 
past levels of dollars earnings in the face of the deteriorating terms of trade, developing 
countries have only encouraged the development unsustainable production structures that 
could have serious medium to long term implications for their non-tradeables, in 
particular, labour and environment. 
The results provided by the LINKAGE Model shows that the developing 
countries as a whole would suffer significant losses as a result of the changes in the terms 
of trade. The total loss that these countries are expected to suffer is expected to be nearly 
US $ 30 billion a year. This sharply contrasts with the projection for the high income 
                                                 
5Prebisch’s study was published as “The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principle 
Problem” and Singer’s as “The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries”. For a 
more recent rendering of the issues involved, see UNCTAD (2005). 
  6countries which should expect more than US $ 30 billion gains annually from the terms 
of trade changes alone. 
Among the developing country groupings, the projected changes in the terms of 
trade bring benefit only to the Latin American region. The South Asian region should 
suffer the largest losses on this account, amounting to more than US $ 11 billion a year, 
and most of these losses would be because of the US $ 9.4 billion losses that India is 
projected to suffer annually
6. The results show that India and China would be suffering 
the largest losses arising from the movements in the terms of trade. This implies that for 
the two emerging economies the projected gains in real income would come at a 
considerable price in terms of domestic resource use. 
The gains from full liberalisation of global merchandise trade, as estimated by the 
LINKAGE Model occur largely due to the liberalisation of agriculture and food sectors. 
Almost two-thirds of the global gains are due to agricultural trade liberalisation and these 
gains are expected mainly because High Income Countries would liberalise their 
agriculture sector. While these results are more along the expected lines, the 
disaggregated results that capture the impact of full global trade liberalisation on 
agricultural and food output as well as trade, should raise plenty heckles in many low 
income developing countries, including India. 
According to the results provided by the Model, global trade liberalisation would 
significantly squeeze the global agricultural output by the year 2015. Agricultural output 
should decrease by almost US $ 138 billion a year relative to the baseline. The members 
of the EU would experience sharp downturn in their output, as would be the case of 
Japan. From amongst the group of developing countries, India and China are expected to 
face decline in agricultural output; in case of the former, the decline is expected to be 
much larger in absolute terms. However, the group of agricultural exporters (the Cairns 
group countries) are likely to have a vastly different experience. Two of the major 
countries in this group, viz. Brazil and Argentina are expected to find their agricultural 
output increase annually by US $ 66 billion and US $ 12 billion respectively. Some of the 
                                                 
6 The losses that India would suffer because of adverse terms of trade would be nearly three times its real 
income gains following from the full liberalisation of global merchandise trade. 
  7South East Asian countries are also expected to register gains, albeit by a relatively small 
amount. But while Brazil and Argentina are projected to make a collective gain of more 
than US 76 billion a year, the gains for the developing countries as a whole are put at US 
$ 67 billion. Quite obviously, thus, some countries among in the developing world are 
expected to suffer significant losses and this group of countries is headed India. The 
projected annual losses for India should be of order of US $ 24 billion a year, which is a 
four per cent decline in relation to the baseline. Along with India, China is also expected 
to be a loser, but of a much smaller magnitude (US $ 10 billion a year). 
The projections made by LINK6 about the winners and losers in the agriculture 
sector following from the global trade liberalisation have yet another significant 
dimension in that the distribution of gains within the developing world is expected to be 
highly skewed. Thus while the middle income countries are expected to register annual 
increases of more than US $ 88 billion a year, the low income countries are expected to 
suffer annual losses of more than US $ 21 billion. These results have serious longer term 
implications since the projected losers in the developing world are those countries that 
are significantly dependent on the agricultural sector as a source of livelihoods for a 
majority of their populations. What the World Bank is therefore trying to tell us is that 
the agricultural sector in developing countries like India, which is already under 
tremendous squeeze, could suffer further as full global trade liberalisation takes effect. 
In respect of trade in agricultural products, the projections provided by LINK6 
have a few surprises. China is shown to be emerging as a major exporter of agricultural 
products, with a likely export growth of nearly 146 per cent over the baseline. In 
comparison, China’s import growth is expected to be a modest 27 per cent. As for India, 
the country is expected to register a tremendous increase in agricultural imports – in 
excess of 165 per cent over the baseline. But India’s exports of agricultural commodities 
would increase by a relatively modest 53 per cent. These figures do not bode well for a 
country that is expecting to improve its presence in the global market for agricultural 
commodities once the prevailing policy distortions are substantially eliminated at the end 
of the current round of negotiations. 
  8An interesting facet of the results on the emerging scenario in agricultural trade is 
that some of the agricultural exporters in the South East Asian countries are not expected 
to do as well. For instance, Thailand should expect a large import surge but only modest 
gains in exports by the year 2015. 
For most developing countries, the objectives of food security and protection of 
livelihoods remains of paramount importance in the current round of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Food security, as is commonly understood, is the access to food at all times 
and at prices that are affordable. Thus, individual countries can ensure realisation of the 
objective of food security by removing uncertainties in supplies and by having a 
reasonable control over the prices of the commodities forming the food basket. It may be 
argued that these twin objectives can at once be realised primarily by promoting local 
production of foodgrains. Furthermore, encouragement to the local production systems in 
developing countries would be the sine qua non for addressing the issue of livelihood 
security in the rural areas. 
The question of whether or not developing countries would be able to address 
their food security concerns by promoting their domestic production systems has been 
addressed in the studies under discussion here. There are however, at least two sets of 
limitations that these results suffer from. In the first place, the results have been presented 
in terms of the broad groups of countries, with the exception of China. Secondly, the 
results for developing countries have been captured via regional groups, but not all 
regional groups have been included in the tables. 
The results indicate that while the developing countries as a whole would be fully 
self-sufficient
7 in respect of food and agricultural products following full global 
liberalisation of merchandise trade, the developed countries would increase their 
dependence on the global markets for these products. As for the regional groups of 
developing countries, the Latin American countries would improve their position as net 
suppliers to the global market, as would the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. At the same 
time, however, the South Asian countries would face deterioration in their self-
                                                 
7 Defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption. 
  9sufficiency ratio, and in case of China, full liberalisation of global merchandise trade 
leaves their self-sufficiency ratio unaltered
8. It may be pointed out that the projected 
deterioration in the self-sufficiency ratio in food and agriculture products for the South 
Asian region is a result of the large imbalance between the growth of imports and exports 
that has been estimated for India. As indicated earlier, LINK6 has estimated a large 
increase in India’s import volumes together with a relatively modest increase in exports 
in the aftermath of full trade liberalisation. 
The discussion in the foregoing shows quite clearly that the claims of a win-win 
situation arising from full liberalisation of merchandise trade which the World Bank has 
never ceased to make, have been challenged by the Bank-supported studies. The results 
indicate that liberalisation of merchandise trade would lead to greater inequities in the 
global economy, much of which would get reflected in the realm of trade. The inequities 
would be just not between the developed and the developing countries, but even between 
developing countries. Thus, while the relatively advanced countries in the Latin 
American and the East, South-East Asian region are expected to perform much better, the 
low income countries, and particularly those in the South Asian region would be 
confirmed as the laggards. The studies also point to a sharp deterioration in the terms of 
trade of a large majority of developing countries that could take place in the aftermath of 
the liberalisation episode. Changes in the terms of trade faced by the developing countries 
and their implications have not been given much importance in the current discourse, but 
it is our view that countries suffering from the adverse terms of trade movements need to 
remember the seminal contributions that Prebisch-Singer and other scholars had made 
while making us understand of the inimical consequences of this phenomenon. 
What strikes as particularly significant is that liberalisation of merchandise trade 
are likely to have deleterious consequences for the agricultural sectors of the South Asian 
region. In this context, results provided for India stand out. The results indicate a decline 
in India’s agricultural output, and as a logical corollary, India is expected to end up 
                                                 
8 The results predict a 91 per cent self-sufficiency ratio for China. This conclusion needs to be seen in the 
context of an earlier World Bank study which had predicted that China could attain a self-sufficiency ratio 
of 90 per cent in cereals, but only if it had made substantial investments in to bolster agricultural 
productivity. See World Bank (1997) 
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India, and some of the other low income countries, would to face should full 
liberalisation of merchandise trade take place. 
The second set of results provides simulations using various proposals in the 
realm of market access that are currently being discussed as a part of the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. The following discussion brings out the key features of 
the results. 
(ii)  The Doha Round Scenarios 
Based on the proposals that are on the negotiating table, eight scenarios have been 
provided for working out the possible outcome the Doha Round. These are: 
(i)  Scenario 1: Tariff reduction using the tiered formula with three rates of reduction 
for developed countries (45, 70 and 75), four for developing countries (35, 40, 50 
and 60) and no reduction for least developed countries. 
(ii)  Scenario 2: Inclusion of “sensitive” products in Scenario 1 with developed 
countries being allowed to treat 2 per cent of their HS 6-digit tariff lines as 
“sensitive”, which would be subjected to tariff reduction of 15 per cent. 
Developing and the least developed countries, allowed 4 per cent of HS 6- digit 
tariff lines as “special” products. 
(iii)  Scenario 3: Inclusion of “sensitive” products in Scenario 1 with developed 
countries being allowed to treat 5 per cent of their HS 6-digit tariff lines as 
“sensitive”, which would be subjected to tariff reduction of 15 per cent. 
Developing and the least developed countries, allowed 10 per cent of HS 6- digit 
tariff lines as “special” products. 
(iv)  Scenario 4: Proportional cut in tariffs that brings about the same reduction in 
average agricultural tariffs in developed countries as a group (44 per cent) and 
developing countries as a group (21 per cent), as would be the case by using the 
tiered formula. 
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countries and 4 per cent “sensitive” and “special” products for developing 
countries. Average tariff reduction as a result would be 16 per cent for developed 
countries and 9 per cent for developing countries. 
(vi)  Scenario 6: Adds to Scenario 5, a tariff cap of 200 per cent – resultant average 
cuts in agricultural tariffs, 18 per cent 
(vii)  Scenario 7: Includes in Scenario 1, cuts in non-agricultural tariff bindings of 50 
per cent to be effected by developed countries, 33 per cent by developing 
countries and none by the least developed countries 
(viii) Scenario 8: Developing and least developed countries take the same level of cuts 
in bound tariffs on non-agricultural products as do the developed countries in 
Scenario 7. 
The results obtained under each of these scenarios have some interesting 
dimensions. The largest gains in real income for all countries and country groupings 
would be made only when there parallelism between tariff reductions in agricultural and 
non-agricultural products becomes a reality
9. At the other extreme are the results obtained 
under Scenario 3, which provides for the inclusion of “sensitive” and “special” in the 
mode. The results show a decline in the real income for developing countries as a whole, 
with only models gains for the developed countries. The studies under discussion are 
therefore predicting that developing countries would be worse-off by taking recourse to 
the special and differential treatment. 
The major results presented for the various Doha Round scenarios need to be 
critically evaluated for these seem to be militating against the position that the developing 
countries have taken during the negotiations. Based on their assessment about the impact 
of trade liberalisation on their economies, developing countries have argued that 
                                                 
9 The implications of this finding should be considered carefully in light of the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration, which in Para 24 instructed the “negotiators to ensure that there is a comparably high level of 
ambition in market access for Agriculture and NAMA”. Although the Declaration added that “[t]his 
ambition is to be achieved in a balanced and proportionate manner consistent with the principle of special 
and differential treatment”, the findings of the studies in question suggest that developing countries would 
be better off by foregoing their S&D options. 
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way in the current Round of negotiations. This principle has been emphasised particularly 
in the area of agriculture, where the concerns for the small and marginal farmers and their 
lack of staying power in the market in the face of competition from the agro-business, 
have been raised. What has lent strength to their arguments is the fact that in several 
developing countries, the “big-bang” liberalisation episodes involving the agriculture has 
had inimical consequences on production and employment in the sector
10. 
It may be pointed out that results presented in the studies do not capture the 
objective reality because of the inherent limitations of the methodology of the model 
employed. In the past few years, critics have pointed to the methodological shortcomings 
of the computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework upon which the LINKAGE 
Model is based. As would be briefly indicated in the next section, the assumptions upon 
which the Model is based are either unrealistic in nature or are far removed from the 
conditions that exist in the developing world. It must be mentioned that the limitations we 
would be alluding to are intrinsic to the Model, in other words, whatever “improved” 
versions of the present studies that the authors may present to us subsequently, the results 
would remain debatable. 
Methodological Limitations of the LINKAGE Model 
In a persuasive article Frank Ackerman
11 has given us plenty to think about the 
structural limitations of the CGE framework. General equilibrium theory bases itself on 
the two Arrow-Debreu theorems developed in the 1950s. The first postulates that 
assuming the existence of a competitive market economy any market equilibrium would 
be Pareto optimum. The second theorem stipulates that under certain conditions every 
Pareto-optimum is a market equilibrium given some initial conditions. There has been 
considerable debate centring on the Arrow-Debreu framework the nub of which is the 
realism of some of the assumptions. Ackerman, for instance, points out that the 
                                                 
10 Dhar (2005) gives an account of the experiences of some of the South East Asian Countries in this 
regard. 
11 Ackerman (1999) 
  13assumptions such as increasing returns to scale is a common occurrence, but if this fact is 
incorporated in the theory, the existence of an equilibrium is no longer certain. This 
would, in other words, imply that a Pareto optimum need not be a market equilibrium. 
The major problem with the CGE models, as has been commented upon by 
several of its critics, stems from the rather limited set of assumptions on which they are 
based. These models are primarily market simulation models incorporating idealistic 
behaviour of producers and consumers across markets and determining equilibrium, 
market-clearing prices and quantities. The limitation of considering the ideal-types could 
lead to problems of aggregation since aggregate demand, for instance, may not be as 
well-behaved as individual demand. Micro-foundations of macroeconomics can therefore 
be fraught with imponderables. 
This general discussion sets the stage for us to look at some of the specifications 
which have been used to define the LINKAGE Model. As we would be indicating briefly, 
some of the assumptions on which the Model is based do not even remotely capture the 
reality, particularly in the developing countries. Sample some of the assumptions made in 
the Model: 
(i)  “All sectors are assumed to operate under cost optimisation”: This assumption 
assumes away market imperfections that may not allow producers to manage 
their operations for ensuring “cost optimisation”. 
(ii)  “Three different production archetypes are defined in the model – crops, 
livestock and all other goods and services. Sectors are differentiated by 
different input combinations and substitution elasticities within each one of 
the main production archetypes”: Clearly the problem of aggregation, as was 
alluded to earlier, would occur because of this assumption. This problem 
would appear in a more acute manner in the case of a country, like India, 
which has an extremely diversified agriculture. 
(iii)  “The key feature of the crop production structure is the substitution between 
intensive cropping versus extensive cropping, i.e. between fertilizer and land”: 
This assumption assumes away the production rigidities that exist in the 
agricultural sectors in the developing countries. For an overwhelmingly large 
  14proportion of the farm population has virtually no choice in so far as changing 
the nature of the crop production. Change in the relative prices of fertilizers 
and land could therefore not lead to any change in the production structure. 
(iv)  “Land is assumed to be partially mobile across agricultural sectors”: Refer to 
comment made in respect of point # (iii). 
(v)  “Each national economy is divided into two distinct geographic zones [which] 
define potentially separate labour markets. A single elasticity … determines 
the nature of the labour market”: Labour markets are far from the ideal-type 
that is assumed for the purposes of the model in question. In particular, the 
assumption of “a single elasticity” does not at all capture the complexities of 
the labour market as exists in developing countries. 
The above-mentioned sample of assumptions made in the LINKAGE Model 
unerringly points to the need for interpreting the results provided by the Model with some 
degree of caution. 
It does appear that some of the leading advocates of the CGE models are quite 
aware of the limitations when they suggest that the results of the models should be 
undergo the test of validation with observations from the real world which they have tried 
to capture. It has been argued that such cross-checking “has to allow for the fact that the 
projections from an AGE (applied general equilibrium) are conditional in that they are 
based on particular assumptions about values of variables exogenous to the model, and, 
as such, the projections could deviate from the actual outcomes if the realised values of 
exogenous variables differed from the assumed values”. It has been further surmised that 
in “actual implementation, aspects of policy could differ from their assumed values”
12.  
Thus, while some of the foremost protagonists of the CGE models have suggested 
that the results of the models should be considered after examining its validity with the 
real world, the authors of the studies under discussion have presented their results in a 
manner that the decision-makers should treat them as absolute benchmarks. In this 
context, it needs to be pointed out that even during the Uruguay Round negotiations, a 
                                                 
12 Kehoe, Srinivasan and Whalley (2005).  
  15plethora of studies, again using the CGE models, projected significant gains for the 
developing countries that turned out to be no more than a chimera
13. Several developing 
countries had, in fact, taken extensive commitments hoping for the gains that the studies 
had projected, but only after two years after the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
package had begun, they were forced to bring to the fore the fact that the anticipated 
gains had not materialised
14.  
By way of conclusions 
This note provided a critical view of the studies based on the LINKAGE Model, a 
variant of the CGE models that have project the possible outcomes of the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. These studies have provided detailed estimates of the 
likely gains/losses for individual countries/groups of countries in 2015, the projected end-
date for the implementation of the commitments which WTO Members would take at the 
end of the current round of negotiations. 
The aggregative results presented in the studies indicate that of the annual gains in 
real income which would result from full liberalisation merchandise trade in all WTO 
Member countries, the share of the developing countries would be a third. According to 
the authors of the studies in question, developing countries should consider the projected 
gains as a favourable outcome since their current share in global production is around 25 
per cent of the total. But what these results also imply is that the wedge between the 
developed and the developing countries would get wider following a disproportionately 
large increase in the gains for the former. 
The detailed results for individual countries/groups of countries only provide 
more evidence of a widening gap between the more prosperous and the less prosperous 
regions of the world. In the developing world, the likely gainers are the more advanced 
middle income countries, while the low income countries, including India, would not be 
faring well. The more disturbing of the results is the projected deterioration of the terms 
                                                 
13 See for instance, Goldin and Mensbrugghe (1993). 
14 These issues were first raised by developing countries as the so-called “implementation issues” in the 
Second Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in 1998.  
  16of trade, particularly of countries like India and China, in the aftermath of full 
liberalisation of global merchandise trade. We have tried to argue that these detailed 
results rather than the aggregative numbers that need to looked at carefully. 
We have also tried to allude to the fact that there is a more fundamental problem 
with these studies. The CGE models are usually based on highly limiting assumptions 
that are far from the reality prevailing in developing countries, in particular. In the note, 
we have provided a sample of the assumptions on which the models are based and have 
pointed to their divergence from the reality. It is to be noted that some of the leading 
advocates for the CGE models have indicated that the results obtained from the models 
must be cross-checked with the real-life conditions in order to ascertain their reliability. 
Such an exercise is of course impossible in respect of the results that the studies in 
question have provided. However, what can be pointed out is that CGE models of an 
earlier generation had projected substantial gains for the developing countries following 
from the implementation of the Uruguay Round package. It would have been in the 
fitness of things if the authors of the papers under discussion had presented their results 
in the backdrop of the past frailties of their models. 
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Table 1: Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by 
country/region, 2015 
 
(relative to the baseline, in 2001 dollars) 
 Countries/Regions  Real income 
gain ($billion) 
Gain due just to 
change in terms of 
trade ($billion) 
as % of baseline 
income in 2015 
Australia and New Zealand   6.1  3.5  1 
EU 25 and EFTA   65.2  0.5  0.6 
United States   16.2  10.7  0.1 
Canada   3.8  -0.3  0.4 
Japan   54.6  7.5  1.1 
Korea and Taiwan  44.6  0.4  3.5 
Hong Kong  and Singapore   11.2  7.9  2.6 
Argentina   4.9  1.2  1.2 
Bangladesh   0.1  -1.1  0.2 
Brazil   9.9  4.6  1.5 
China   5.6  -8.3  0.2 
India   3.4  -9.4  0.4 
Indonesia   1.9  0.2  0.7 
Thailand   7.7  0.7  3.8 
Vietnam   3  -0.2  5.2 
Russia 2.7  -2.7  0.6 
Mexico   3.6  -3.6  0.4 
South Africa   1.3  0  0.9 
Turkey   3.3  0.2  1.3 
Rest of South Asia   1  -0.8  0.5 
Rest of East Asia   5.3  -0.9  1.9 
Rest of LAC  10.3  0  1.2 
Rest of ECA  1  -1.6  0.3 
Middle East and North Africa   14  -6.4  1.2 
Selected Sub-Saharan Africa   1  0.5  1.5 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   2.5  -2.3  1.1 
Rest of world   3.4  0.1  1.5 
High-income countries   201.6  30.3  0.6 
Developing countries—WTO definition 141.5  -21.4  1.2 
Developing countries   85.7  -29.7  0.8 
Middle-income countries   69.5  -16.7  0.8 
Low-income countries   16.2  -12.9  0.8 
East Asia and the Pacific   23.5  -8.5  0.7 
South Asia   4.5  -11.2  0.4 
Europe and Central Asia   7  -4  0.7 
Middle East and North Africa   14  -6.4  1.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa   4.8  -1.8  1.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean   28.7  2.2  1 
World total   287.3  0.6  0.7 
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Table 2: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of global merchandise 
trade, developing and high-income countries, 2015 
 
(relative to baseline scenario) a 
Gains by region in $ billion  Percent of global gain   Countries/Regions 
   Developing High-income  World  Developing   High-income  World 
Developing countries                    
Agriculture, food   28  19  47  33  9  17 
Textiles, clothing   9  14  23  10  7  8 
Other merchandise   6  52  58  7  26  20 
All sectors   43  85  128  50  42  45 
High-income countries                    
Agriculture, food   26  109  135  30  54  47 
Textiles, clothing   13  2  15  15  1  5 
Other merchandise   4  5  9  5  2  3 
All sectors   43  116  159  50  57  55 
All countries liberalize:                   
Agriculture, food   54  128  182  63  64  63 
Textiles, clothing   22  16  38  25  8  14 
Other merchandise   10  57  67  12  28  23 
All sectors   86  201  287  100  100  100 
           
a Small interaction effects are distributed proportionately and numbers are rounded to sum to 100 percent.   
           
        
  20Table 3: Impacts of full global trade liberalization on agricultural and food output and 
trade, by country/region, 2015 
 
(relative to the baseline) 
 Countries/Regions  $billion  Percent change relative to 
baseline 
    Exports Imports Output Exports Imports Output 
Australia and New Zealand   18  1.4  27.9  38  23  20.5 
EU 25 and EFTA   21.7  103.5  -185.8  -10.8  39.3  -12.3 
United States   18.4  16.5  30.7  11.6  25.6  0 
Canada   14.6  6.9  7.2  40.2  54.3  4.8 
Japan   2.8  34.7  -91.7 60.4  169.7  -18.4 
Korea and Taiwan   33.2  12.3  -0.4  600.2  189.8  20.2 
Hong Kong and Singapore   7 1.5  7.4  115.2 7.6  35.4 
Argentina   10.4  0.7  12.2  44.2  36.9  11.5 
Bangladesh 0.8  0.4  -2.5  60.9  15.6  0.8 
Brazil 38  2.8  66.4  120.6  48.4  34 
China    15.1 24.1  -9.9  145.6 27.3  -0.9 
India   5.1  13.4  -23.8  53.2  165.4  -3.7 
Indonesia 3.6  1.9  4.5  32.2  23.5  2.4 
Thailand 5.6  5.2  5.3  29.2  57.2  4.7 
Vietnam 1.2  3.3  -2.1  13.9  170.4  -13.3 
Russia 0.7  4.4  -7.8  15.4  22.3  -5.4 
Mexico   11.9  6.7  6.2  66  52.9  2.2 
South Africa   2.4  1.1  1.4  55.9  40.2  4.9 
Turkey 4.3  4.3  -0.1  109.4  140.3  0.5 
Rest of South Asia   2.9  3.7  -1.5  57.1  83.3  -1.8 
Rest of East Asia and the Pacific   9.4  5.8  7.4  61.7  50.7  6.8 
Rest of LAC  36  9.6  37  68.1  42.3  11.7 
Rest  of  ECA  9.2 10.9  -22.2 106 90.5  -1.6 
Middle East and North Africa   13.2 17.5  -7.8 64.1 43.1  -1.2 
Selected SSA countries  4.5 1.3  5.3 50  74.4  9.2 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   9.5  8.1  -4.1  45.4  79.2  -0.6 
Rest of world   8.2  5.8 2.9  168.3  123.3 4.4 
High-income countries   115.8  176.7  -204.7  15.7  65.5  -5.3 
Developing countries   191.9 131  66.8  67.4  51.5  2.2 
Middle-income countries   156.1 93.1  88.2 72.7 41.9 3.2 
Low-income  countries    35.8 37.9  -21.4 52.3 99.3  -1 
East Asia and the Pacific   34.8 40.4 5.2 54.4 35.5 0.1 
South Asia   8.9  17.5  -27.8  55.1  122.9  -3 
Europe and Central Asia   14.2  19.6  -30  79.7  62.6  -1.9 
Middle East and North Africa   13.2 17.5  -7.8 64.1 43.1  -1.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa   16.4 10.5 2.6 47.7 71.6 2.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean    96.3 19.8  121.8 75.7 46.1  13.8 
World total (excluding intra-EU 
trade)  
307.7 307.7  -137.8  36.3  59.8 -1.3 
         
        
  21Table 4: Impact of global liberalization on self sufficiency in food and agricultural products, selected regions, 2015 
 






















Rice   97  49  99  101  91  78  97  98  102  102 100 108 
Wheat                            137 118 89 91 53 35 90 119 98 98 90 92
Other grains   103  99  90  84  101  102  104  103  99  99      76 32
Oilseeds   119  55  75  90  158  279  184  247  100  102      1 1
Sugar   92  47  100  113  109  116  126  173  99  99      45 27
Plant-based fibers   117  78  95  104  385  694  94  109  87  92      93 95
Vegetables and  fruits   83  72  103  105  137  141  146  183  95  88      97 97
Other crops   83  85  110  106  167  174  140  132  104  104      11 10
Livestock                            103 104 98 98 103 103 103 102 99 99 94 94
Other natural resources   91  91  102  102  125  125  128  127  95  95      92 92
Fossil fuels   81  81  119  120  147  154  116  115  66  57      85 82
Processed meats   99  89  98  109  96  136  105  132  98  101      89 85
Vegetable oils, fats   96  91  98  99  85  72  111  106  65  25      96 90
Dairy products   103  100  88  92  74  78  92  94  97  97      60 57
Other food, beverages & tobacco   97  99  101  96  100  93  106  106  111  108      97 96
Textiles 91                        91 99 98 75 62 85 79 130 134 99 98
Wearing  apparel                            63 55 153 162 78 62 92 80 513 765 225 255
Leather products   58  53  136  138  85  59  107  87  170  186      156 164
Chemicals, rubber, plastics   103  104  89  87  70  66  79  74  91  89      92 89
Iron, steel   99  100  97  96  94  93  100  92  95  92      93 92
Motor vehicles, parts   101  102  87  82  58  68  101  99  94  84      88 79
Capital goods   101  100  93  93  45  45  81  79  79  79      104 106
Other manufacturing   95  95  105  104  115  108  98  92  97  94      111 112
Agriculture and food   98  93  99  100  108  111  111  120  99  96      91 91
Agriculture    97                        84 98 100 118 123 121 134 99 98 88 88
Processed  foods                            98 97 99 98 98 97 105 111 98 87 96 94
Textile and wearing apparel   74  70  114  116  77  61  92  81  149  163      125 129
Other manufacturing   98  98  98  97  92  91  93  89  88  85      101 101
         
Self sufficiency is defined as domestic production as a percentage of domestic consumption               
 Table 5: Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 (Dollar change in 2001 $billion compared to 
baseline scenario) 
 
 Countries/Regions  Scen. 1   Scen. 2   Scen. 3   Scen. 4   Scen. 5   Scen. 6   Scen. 7   Scen. 8  
Australia and New  Zealand   2  1.1  1.1 2.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 2.8 
EU 25 and EFTA   29.5  10.7  9.1 28.2 10.7 10.9 31.4 35.7 
United  States    3  2.3 2 3.4 2.5 2.1 4.9 6.6 
Canada   1.4  0.5  0.3 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.9  1 
Japan   18.9  1.8  1.3  15.1  1.4 12.9 23.7 25.4 
Korea and Taiwan  10.9  1.7  1.6  7.3  1.7 15.9  15 22.6 
Hong Kong and Singapore   -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  1.5  2.2 
Argentina    1.3 1 1 1.4 1.1  1 1.3 1.6 
Bangladesh    0  0  0 0 0 0  -0.1  -0.1 
Brazil    3.3  1.1  0.9 3.2 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9 
China    -0.5  -1.5  -1.6 -0.4 -1.4 -1.1  1.7  1.6 
India   0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5 
Indonesia    0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 0 1  1.2 
Thailand    0.9  0.6  0.3  1 0.8 0.8  2 2.7 
Vietnam    -0.1 0 0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 
Russia  -0.3  -0.7  -0.8 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7  0.8  1.5 
Mexico    -0.2  -0.3  -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 
South Africa   0.1  0.3  0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Turkey    0.6 0 0 0.5 0.1  0 0.7 1.4 
Rest of South Asia   0.2  0.1  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 
Rest of East Asia   0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1  1 0.3 0.6 
Rest of LAC  3.7  0.5  0.5 3.7 0.5 0.4 3.9  4 
Rest  of  ECA  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 
Middle East and North Africa   -0.8  -1.2  -1.5  -0.9  -1.2  -1.2  -0.6  0.1 
Selected SSA Countries  0.1  0  0  0.1 0 0  0.1  0.2 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   0  -0.3  -0.3  0  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1  0.3 
Rest of world   0.4  0  0  0.3  0  0  0.6  0.6 
High-income countries   65.6  18.1  15.2 57.2 17.8 43.2 79.9 96.4 
Developing countries   9  -0.4  -1.7 9.1 0.1 1.1  16.1  22.9 
Middle-income    8  -0.5  -1.9  8.3 0 1  12.5  17.1 
Low-income countries   1  0.1  0.1 0.8 0.2  0 3.6 5.9 
East Asia and the  Pacific   0.5  -0.8  -1.2 0.9  -0.4 0.6 4.5 5.5 
South Asia   0.4  0.3  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.5 4.2 
Europe and Central Asia   0.1  -0.9  -1.1  0.2  -0.9  -0.9  0.8  2.1 
Middle East and North  Africa   -0.8  -1.2  -1.5 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6  0.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa   0.3  0  -0.2  0.3  -0.2  -0.1  0.4  1.2 
Latin America and the  Caribbean   8.1  2.3 2  8 2.5 2.1 7.9 9.2 
World total   74.5  17.7  13.4 66.3 17.9 44.3 96.1  119.3 
 
 Table 6: Change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 Percentage change (in 2001 $billion 
compared to baseline scenario) 
 
Countries/Regions  Scen. 1   Scen. 2   Scen. 3   Scen. 4   Scen. 5   Scen. 6   Scen. 7   Scen. 8  
Australia and New Zealand   0.35  0.2 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.2 0.42 0.48 
EU 25 and EFTA   0.29  0.11  0.09 0.28 0.11  0.11 0.31 0.36 
United States   0.02  0.02  0.01 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.03 0.05 
Canada    0.15 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.05  0.1 0.11 
Japan    0.38 0.04 0.03  0.3 0.03  0.26 0.48 0.51 
Korea and Taiwan   0.86  0.13 0.13 0.58 0.14  1.26 1.19 1.79 
Hong Kong and ]Singapore   -0.02  -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04  -0.04  0.35  0.52 
Argentina    0.32 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.27  0.26 0.34 0.39 
Bangladesh    -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04  -0.1 -0.09 
Brazil    0.5 0.16 0.13 0.49 0.17  0.17 0.55 0.59 
China    -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01  -0.05  -0.04 0.07 0.06 
India    0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25  0.4 
Indonesia    0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09  0.01 0.37 0.44 
Thailand    0.43 0.29 0.15 0.49 0.38  0.38 0.99 1.33 
Vietnam    -0.2 -0.09 -0.06 -0.22 -0.11  -0.16 -0.83 -0.97 
Russia  -0.06 -0.16 -0.17 -0.03  -0.15  -0.15 0.16 0.31 
Mexico    -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04  -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
South Africa   0.06  0.17  0.05 0.09 0.11  0.17 0.25 0.49 
Rest of South Asia   0.13  0.05 0.05 0.11 0.06  0.14 0.17 0.39 
Rest of East Asia   0.02  0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04  0.36 0.09 0.22 
Rest  of  LAC  0.44 0.06 0.06 0.43 0.06  0.04 0.46 0.47 
Rest  of  ECA  -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09  -0.08 -0.22 -0.26 
Middle East and North Africa   -0.07  -0.1 -0.13 -0.07  -0.1 -0.1 -0.05  0.01 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   0.02  -0.13 -0.13  0.01 -0.14  -0.14 -0.02  0.13 
Rest of world   0.19  0  0  0.14  0  0.02  0.26  0.28 
High-income countries   0.2  0.06 0.05 0.18 0.05  0.13 0.25  0.3 
Developing countries   0.09  0  -0.02 0.09  0  0.01 0.16 0.22 
Middle-income   0.1  -0.01  -0.02  0.1  0  0.01 0.15 0.21 
Low-income countries   0.05  0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01  0 0.18  0.3 
East Asia and the Pacific   0.01  -0.02  -0.03 0.03  -0.01  0.02 0.13 0.16 
South Asia   0.03  0.03  0.02 0.02 0.03  0.03 0.21 0.36 
Europe and Central Asia   0.01  -0.09  -0.11 0.02  -0.09  -0.09 0.08 0.21 
Middle East and North  Africa   -0.07  -0.1 -0.13 -0.07  -0.1 -0.1 -0.05  0.01 
Sub-Saharan Africa   0.06  -0.01  -0.05 0.06  -0.04  -0.02  0.1 0.27 
Latin America and the Caribbean   0.29 0.08 0.07 0.29 0.09  0.08 0.29 0.33 
World total   0.18  0.04  0.03 0.16 0.04 0.1 0.23 0.28 
  24Table 7: Share of agricultural and food production exported under different scenario, 2001 and 2015 (percent)
      
 Countries/Regions  Baseline 2001  Baseline  Full global lib’n 
2015 
Scen. 7 
Australia and New Zealand   33.3  37.2  42.7  39.5 
EU 25 and EFTA   16.7  17.3  17.6  16.6 
EU 25 and EFTA (excluding intra- EU25)   4  5.1  7.7  5 
United States   6.3  7.9  9.2  8.1 
Canada   24.5  29.5  40  32.5 
Japan   0.9  1.2  2.3  1.5 
Korea and Taiwan   4.4  4.8  26.5  8.6 
Hong Kong and Singapore   26  30  47.8  30.8 
Argentina   21.6  25.2  32.5  26.9 
Bangladesh 1.7  3.6  5.7  3.5 
Brazil 15.3  17.3  28.9  21.7 
China   3.3  0.9  2.2  1 
India   3.5  3  4.7  3.3 
Indonesia 11.9  10  12.9  9.9 
Thailand 30.2  28.2  34.6  30.1 
Vietnam 23.9  26.9  35.3  26.7 
Russia 6.1  5.5  6.7  6 
Mexico   5.6  7.8  13.2  8.5 
South Africa   16  12.7  18.8  13.5 
Turkey 9.6  6  12.4  7 
Rest of South Asia   6  6.2  9.9  6.6 
Rest of East Asia  16.1  14.6  22.1  14.9 
Rest of LAC  13.9  18.1  27.1  20.7 
Rest of ECA  2.4  1.7  3.7  1.9 
Middle East and North Africa   5.2  6.7  11.2  7.2 
Selected SSA Countries  13.2 18.1  25.4  19.2 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   11.2  15.8  23.3  16.5 
Rest of world   6.6  7  17.7  8.7 
High-income countries   5.8  7.5  11.6  8.2 
Developing countries   7.5  6.9  11.6  7.8 
Middle-income countries   7.6  6.6  11.4  7.6 
Low-income countries   7.3  7.9  12.4  8.4 
East Asia and the Pacific   7.2  4.1  6.5  4.3 
South Asia   3.8  3.6  5.7  3.9 
Europe and Central Asia   3.7  2.7  5  3 
Middle East and North Africa   5.2  6.7  11.2  7.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa   12.5  15.8  23.1  16.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean   12.7  15.9  24.8  18.5 
World total   9.5  9.5  13.2  10 
World total (excl. intra-EU25)   6.6  7.2  11.6  8 
 
Source (for Tables 1 to 7: Anderson et. al. (2006) 
 